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INTRODUCTION 
Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933 (“1933 Act”) and the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“1934 Act,” and collectively, 
“Securities Acts”) in response to the stock market crash of 1929, which 
devastated financial markets and plunged the nation into the Great 
Depression. 1   Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC” or 
“Commission”) enforcement under these laws is generally concerned 
with those who are “primarily liable:”  a person or entity that violates a 
specific provision of the securities laws.2  However, the SEC has also 
                                                                                                                                         
 1. Erin L. Massey, Control Person Liability Under Section 20(a): Striking A 
Balance of Interests for Plaintiffs and Defendants, 6 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 109, 111–
12 (2005). 
 2. George E. Van Hoey, Liability for “Causing” Violations of the Federal 
Securities Laws: Defining the SEC’s Next Counterattack in the Battle of Central Bank, 
60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 248, 254 (2003). 
2014] DODD-FRANK'S IMPACT ON  641 
SEC ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 
taken action against those who are secondarily liable.3  That is, those 
who were in a “control relationship” with the perpetrator, or they aided 
and abetted the violations.4 
The SEC has multiple rationales for pursuing secondary actors.  
First, secondary actors often serve as “gate-keepers” (e.g., accountants, 
lawyers, auditors, and others who can possibly detect and deter 
fraudulent activity before it happens).5  Second, in cases of companies 
such as Enron or WorldCom, the primary actor is bankrupt by the time 
their wrongdoing is discovered, leaving defrauded investors with no way 
to recoup their losses.6 
Recognizing the need for increased liability for secondary actors 
after the financial crisis of 2008, Congress included provisions in the 
Dodd-Frank Act (“Dodd-Frank”), which made it easier for the SEC to 
pursue both aiders and abettors and control persons.7  The extent to 
which these new powers will be used relies largely on how courts 
interpret the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Janus Capital Group 
Inc. v. First Derivative Traders.8 
Part I of this Note will explain the statutory authority the SEC uses 
to pursue secondary actors before Dodd-Frank.  Part II will examine the 
degree to which administrative and federal courts have demanded the 
SEC prove each element of liability.  Part III will explain statutory 
changes brought by Dodd-Frank.  Finally, Part IV will explain the 
implications of the Janus decision, and its impact on SEC enforcement 
for secondary actors. 
I. SECONDARY LIABILITY IN THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND 
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 
This Part will lay out the legal remedies the SEC sought in pursuing 
aiders, abettors, and control persons prior to the changes implemented in 
Dodd-Frank, as well as the legislative history underlying the language of 
the statutes. 
                                                                                                                                         
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 265. 
 5. Shuenn (Patrick) Ho, A Missed Opportunity for “Wall Street Reform”: 
Secondary Liability for Securities Fraud After the Dodd-Frank Act, 49 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 175, 183–84 (2012). 
 6. Id. at 185. 
 7. See infra Part III. 
 8. Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011). 
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A. AIDING AND ABETTING LIABILITY IN THE SECURITIES ACTS 
Initially, the SEC had very limited authority to bring aiding and 
abetting actions.9  The only provision under the Securities Acts that 
imposed liability for aiding and abetting was section 15(b)(4) of the 
1934 Act and pertained only to broker-dealers.10  The SEC still brought 
aiding and abetting charges, however, by using formulations of tort law 
and criminal law to justify its authority. 11   The actions generally 
accompanied charges of Section 10(b), the SEC’s catchall provision on 
fraud charges, and Rule 10b-5,12 the SEC rule promulgated pursuant to 
Section 10(b).13 
In the decades following the passage of the Securities Acts, 
numerous attempts were made to amend them to explicitly prohibit 
aiding and abetting. 14   However, the SEC did not officially gain 
statutory authority to pursue aiders and abettors until 1995, when 
Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation and Reform Act 
(“PSLRA”).15  The PSLRA added Section 20(e), which, prior to the 
changes implemented by Dodd-Frank, provided: 
                                                                                                                                         
 9. Alan R. Bromberg & Lewis D. Lowenfels, Aiding and Abetting Securities 
Fraud: A Critical Examination, 52 ALB. L. REV. 637, 639–41 (1988) [hereinafter 
Bromberg & Lowenfels, Aiding and Abetting Securities Fraud]. 
 10. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4) (2012). 
 11. See, e.g., SEC v. Timetrust, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 34, 43 (N.D. Cal. 1939) (allowing 
aiding and abetting due to criminal law formulation of aiding and abetting theory). 
 12. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 prohibits the use “in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . [of] any manipulative or 
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the 
[Securities and Exchange] Commission may prescribe.”  Rule 10b–5 of the SEC, 
promulgated under section 10(b), makes it unlawful for any person to “employ any 
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,” or to “engage in any act, practice, or course of 
business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.” Chiarella v. United States, 445 
U.S. 222, 225–26 (1980). 
 13. Id.; see, e.g., Timetrust, 28 F. Supp. at 43 (allowing aiding and abetting due to 
criminal law formulation of aiding and abetting theory). 
 14. Bromberg & Lowenfels, Aiding and Abetting Securities Fraud, supra note 9, at 
641–42. 
 15. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No.104–67, 109 Stat. 
737 (1995) (“For purposes of any action brought by the Commission under paragraph 
(1) or (3) of section 21(d), any person that knowingly provides substantial assistance to 
another person in violation of a provision of this title, or of any rule or regulation issued 
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For purposes of any action brought by the Commission under 
paragraph (1) or (3) of section 21(d), any person that knowingly or 
recklessly provides substantial assistance to another person in violation 
of a provision of this title, or of any rule or regulation issued under this 
title, shall be deemed to be in violation of such provision to the same 
extent as the person to whom such assistance is provided.16 
As will be discussed later, the portion of the PSLRA granting the 
SEC explicit authority to pursue aiders and abettors was in large part a 
reaction to the Supreme Court’s decision in Central Bank v. Denver, 
which cast doubt on the ability of the SEC to pursue enforcement 
actions against aiders and abettors.17 
B. CONTROL PERSON LIABILITY IN THE SECURITIES ACTS 
The Securities Acts each have specific provisions aimed at 
imposing liability on those who were in a control relationship with those 
who committed illegal acts. 18   The addition of provisions creating 
liability for this behavior were a result of the general sentiment that 
many of those who had contributed most to the crash were shielded from 
liability because of the regulatory scheme at the time.19  Section 15 of 
the 1933 Act provides: 
Every person who, by or through stock ownership, agency, or 
otherwise, or who, pursuant to or in connection with an agreement or 
understanding with one or more persons by or through stock 
ownership, or otherwise, controls any person liable under sections 
[11 or 12] of this title shall be also liable jointly and severally with 
and to the same extent as such controlled person to any person to 
whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person 
had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the 
                                                                                                                                         
under this title, shall be deemed to be in violation of such provision to the same extent 
as the person to whom such assistance is provided.”). 
 16. Id. 
 17. See infra Part II. 
 18. Alan R. Bromberg & Lewis D. Lowenfels, Controlling Person Liability Under 
Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act and Section 15 of the Securities Act, 53 
BUS. LAW. 1, 7 (1997) [hereinafter Bromberg & Lowenfels, Controlling Person 
Liability]. 
 19. See id. 
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existence of the facts by reasons of which the liability of the 
controlled person is alleged to exist.20 
Section 20(a) of the 1934 Act contains similar language, and it has 
been recognized to have been modeled on the 1933 Act: 
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable 
under any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation 
thereunder shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the 
same extent as such controlled person to any person to whom such 
controlled person is liable (including to the Commission in any 
action brought under paragraph (1) or (3) of section 78u(d) of this 
title), unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not 
directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation 
or cause of action.21     
  
The legislative history behind the 1934 Act makes it clear that the 
purpose of these sections was to prevent those who were actually 
ordering the illegal behavior from escaping liability.22  As Congressman 
Lea explained on the House floor, the purpose of the provision was  
“to catch the man who stands behind the scenes and controls the man 
who is in a nominal position of authority.”23  In order to ensure that the 
statute covered the myriad ways in which control could be asserted, 
Congress intentionally omitted a definition of “control” from the 
statutory language. 24   In response to criticism from the securities 
industry that the definition of control person was too broad, Congress 
added the “no knowledge” or “reasonable ground” defense to the 1933 
Act, and the “good faith” defense to the 1934 Act.25  The part of the 
provision explicitly granting power to the Commission was not in the 
                                                                                                                                         
 20. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C § 770(a)-(b) (2012) (“[A]ny person that 
knowingly or recklessly provides substantial assistance to another person in violation of 
a provision of this subchapter, or of any rule or regulation issued under this subchapter, 
shall be deemed to be in violation of such provision to the same extent as the person to 
whom such assistance is provided.”). 
 21. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2012). 
 22. Bromberg & Lowenfels, Controlling Person Liability, supra note 18, at 3. 
 23. Id. 
 24. H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 26 (1934) (“It would be difficult if not impossible to 
enumerate or to anticipate the many ways in which actual control may be exerted.”). 
 25. Bromberg & Lowenfels, Controlling Person Liability, supra note 18, at 3. 
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original acts, leading to some dispute as to whether or not the 
Commission was covered.26 
II. SECONDARY LIABILITY ENFORCEMENT PRIOR TO DODD-FRANK 
In order to understand the impact the changes to Dodd-Frank could 
have on the SEC’s ability to bring enforcement actions against 
secondary actors, a review of the level of scrutiny demanded by federal 
courts and administrative law judges is necessary.  This Part will discuss 
the elements required to show aiding and abetting in both federal courts 
and SEC administrative proceedings,27 and discuss the impact of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate 
Bank of Denver28 and the PSLRA on those elements.  It will then discuss 
the ambiguity as to the SEC’s ability to bring actions against control 
persons prior to Dodd-Frank. 
A. ELEMENTS OF AIDING AND ABETTING IN FEDERAL COURTS PRIOR TO 
DODD-FRANK 
1. Aiding and Abetting Prior to Central Bank 
The SEC first used its powers against an aider and abettor in 1939, 
in SEC v. Timetrust.29  The case concerned fraudulent activity on the 
part of Timetrust Corporation, but the aiding and abetting action was 
against several individuals and Bank of America.30  The SEC cited no 
provision to include the aiding and abetting defendants.  Instead, it 
relied on general principles of criminal law, arguing that in a criminal 
proceeding, anyone who aided and abetted a crime could be charged as a 
co-defendant.31  Therefore, it stood to reason the same rationale should 
                                                                                                                                         
 26. See infra Part III. 
 27. While the primary focus of this Note is enforcement actions in federal courts, 
as Janus and Dodd-Frank will affect the SEC’s abilities to seek disciplinary action in 
administrative proceedings, a brief discussion of the elements necessary to impose 
liability in administrative proceedings is necessary. 
 28. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 
164 (1994). 
 29. SEC v. Timetrust, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 34 (N.D. Cal. 1939). 
 30. Id. at 36. 
 31. Id. 
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apply in an administrative proceeding for a violation of the securities 
laws.32  The court agreed with this argument.33 
The next case crucial to the development of the formulation of 
aiding and abetting liability in a federal case was actually a private 
action case.  In Brennan v. Midwestern United Life, the court found for 
the plaintiff in an action against an issuer of securities who aided and 
abetted a Section 10(b) violation.34  The court rejected the defense’s 
argument that the lack of explicit language pertaining to aiding and 
abetting in the Securities Acts meant that there was no remedy for aiding 
and abetting.35  The court indicated that the federal securities laws were 
intended to be applied with “broad and remedial” purposes. 36   By 
limiting their application too narrowly, courts would be unable to apply 
them to the various new situations that could present themselves. 37  
Therefore, the court found, courts should apply liability for aiding and 
abetting pursuant to Rule 10b-5.38 
The court also pointed out that the legislative history actually 
indicated that the SEC should have power to pursue aiders and abettors: 
If it was then generally understood that the SEC had injunctive 
power against aiders and abettors under the 1934 Act, as the 
legislative hearings on the proposed amendments indicate, the 
defendant here cannot successfully contend that the failure to pass 
the clarifying amendment shows a Congressional intent that the Act 
has no applicability to aiders and abettors.39 
                                                                                                                                         
 32. Id. at 43. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 680–81 (N.D. 
Ind. 1966). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. (“[A] statue with a broad and remedial purpose such as the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 should not easily be rendered impotent to deal with new and 
unique situations within the scope of the evils intended to be eliminated. In the absence 
of a clear legislative expression to the contrary, the statute must be flexibly applied so 
as to implement its policies and purposes.  In this regard, it cannot be said that civil 
liability for damages, so well established under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
may never under any circumstances be imposed upon persons who do no more than aid 
and abet a violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”). 
 39. Id. at 678. 
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The court went on to find liability, citing the Third Restatement of 
Torts’ language on liability for those acts that aid in the tortious conduct 
of a third party.40    
Courts continued to use the combination of tort law and criminal 
law to find secondary actors liable for aiding and abetting violations of 
the securities laws, and eventually, a three-part test was accepted by all 
circuit courts with regards to the elements needed to prove aiding and 
abetting liability.41  First set forth by the Sixth Circuit in SEC v. Coffey, 
the test for establishing liability demanded (1) the existence of a 
securities law violation by the primary party, (2) knowledge of the 
violation by the aider and abettor in the achievement of the primary 
violation, and (3) “substantial assistance” by the aider and abettor in the 
achievement of the primary violation.42 
2. Central Bank and Its Impact on Aiding and Abetting Liability 
The Supreme Court first considered the issue of civil liability for 
aiders and abettors in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate 
Bank of Denver, N.A.43  A primary reason the Court granted certiorari 
was to resolve the circuit split with respect to what level of scienter 
satisfies the “knowledge of violation” prong.44  The Court, however, 
struck down the private right of action for aiding and abetting section 
10(b) violations altogether.45 
                                                                                                                                         
 40. Id. (“For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, 
a person is liable if he ‘(b) knows that the other’s conduct constitutes a breach of duty 
and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself, or 
‘(c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result and his 
own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third person.”). 
 41. 4 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 
12.25 (2004). 
 42. SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.3d 1304, 1316 (6th Cir. 1974). 
 43. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 
164 (1994). 
 44. SEC v. Peretz, 317 F. Supp. 2d 58, 63 (D. Mass. 2004) (citing Dinsmore v. 
Squadron, Ellenoff, Plelent, Sheinfeld & Sorkin, 125 F.3d 837, 844 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(“[O]ne of the question on which the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Central Bank 
was whether recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement for aiding and abetting in 
the absence of a duty to disclose or act.”)). 
 45. Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 164. 
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The case concerned an issuance of bonds by the Colorado Springs-
Stetson Hills Public Building Authority.46  These bonds were backed by 
landowner liens, supposedly worth 160% of the bonds’ outstanding 
principal and interest.47  Central Bank, which was serving as trustee for 
the bond issue, received notice that the property values for the land 
backing the bonds was dropping, but delayed making an independent 
appraisal.48  Before they were able to do so, the Authority defaulted on 
the bond.49  Shareholders brought suit against, among others, Central 
Bank, alleging it was secondarily liable under section 10(b) for its 
conduct in aiding and abetting the fraud.50  In a 5-4 decision, the Court 
ruled that the language of section 10(b) did not allow private litigants to 
reach aiders and abettors in derivative actions.51 
The Court’s holding was structured on a strict reading of the 
language of the 1934 Act.  Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, 
indicated that Congress had the opportunity to include the language “aid 
and abet” in the statutory language.52  Its decision not to do so, Justice 
Kennedy concluded, implied that it did not intend aiding and abetting 
violations to be covered. 53   Justice Kennedy also pointed out that 
provisions in the 1934 Act included a separate section specifically 
establishing liability for aiding and abetting for broker-dealers, 
bolstering his argument that Congress did not implicitly intend for 
aiding and abetting liability to attach to section 10(b).54  Finally, the 
Court acknowledged criminal law’s doctrine on aiders and abettors, but 
rejected its application to section 10(b).55   Warning of the potential 
consequences of applying civil liability to a section 10(b) action, Justice 
Kennedy argued that attaching civil liability to aiding and abetting 
section 10(b) violations would imply that a civil cause of action could be 
                                                                                                                                         
 46. Id. at 167. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 168. 
 51. Id. at 191. 
 52. Id. at 177 (“[I]f . . . Congress intended to impose aiding and abetting liability, 
we presume it would have used the words ‘aid’ and ‘abet’ in the statutory test.  But it 
did not.”). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 183. 
 55. Id. at 190–191. 
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attached to not only every provision of the Securities Acts, but to any 
criminal statute.56 
The majority opinion also stressed that this holding did not exempt 
secondary actors from liability. 57   The simple solution to imposing 
liability on secondary actors, the Court explained, was to charge them 
with a primary violation.58  Any secondary actor, the Court pointed out, 
who meaningfully participated in some sort of fraudulent scheme, could 
potentially be charged under Section 10b-5 or another provision in the 
Securities Acts.59       
Justice Stevens, writing for the dissent, took issue with the 
majority’s statement that the holding was limited to private rights of 
action.60  Justice Stevens warned that the majority’s interpretation of 
section 10(b) would have far-reaching impact, arguing that the language 
of the opinion could easily be interpreted to limit the SEC from pursuing 
liability under section 10(b).61   Justice Stevens also warned that the 
language of the majority could be interpreted to extend beyond section 
10(b) actions, arguing that the analysis posited by the majority could be 
applied to any form of secondary liability not explicitly spelled out in 
the Securities Acts’ statutes.62 
Justice Stevens was correct to be wary of the decision’s impact on 
SEC actions.  In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfolder,63 the Court held that in 
order for a plaintiff to win damages in a section 10(b) action, he must 
                                                                                                                                         
 56. Id. (“[W]e would also have to hold that a civil aiding and abetting cause of 
action is available for every provision of the Act. There would be no logical stopping 
point to this line of reasoning: Every criminal statute passed for the benefit of some 
particular class of persons would carry with it a concomitant civil damages cause of 
action.”). 
 57. Id. at 191. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 200 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
 61. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The majority leaves little doubt that the Exchange 
Act does not even permit the SEC to pursue aiders and abettors in civil enforcement 
actions under § 10(b). . . .”). 
 62. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Moreover, the majority’s approach to aiding and 
abetting at the very least casts serious doubt, both for private and SEC actions, 
on other forms of secondary liability that, like the aiding and abetting theory, have long 
been recognized by the SEC and the courts but are not expressly spelled out in the 
securities statutes.”). 
 63. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). 
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prove that the violator had the requisite scienter.64  In a subsequent SEC 
enforcement action, the Court applied the same burden to the SEC, 
using the same rationale.65 The majority in Central Bank, like that in 
Hochfelder, was using a strict statutory construction, which could easily 
be interpreted by courts as being applied to the SEC.66  As it happened, 
in the immediate aftermath of the Central Bank decision, the SEC 
amended twenty-six aiding and abetting complaints.67 
3. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
The impact of the decision in Central Bank, however, was not lost 
in Congress.  Almost immediately, it passed the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995.68  Section 104 of the PSLRA amended 
the 1934 Act to add section 20(e), which provided: 
[F]or purposes of any act brought by the Commission . . . any person 
that knowingly provides substantial assistance to another person in 
violation of a provision of this chapter, or of any rule or regulation 
issued under this chapter, or of any rule or regulation issued under 
this chapter, shall be deemed to be in violation of such provision to 
the same extent as the person to whom such assistance is provided.69
   
Despite the clear language of the statute, the SEC’s ability to bring 
actions was nonetheless challenged almost immediately. 
In SEC v. Fehn, the SEC brought charges against an attorney for 
aiding and abetting numerous securities laws by filing Form 10-Q, 
                                                                                                                                         
 64. Id. at 185–86. 
 65. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980). 
 66. Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 200 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The principle 
the Court espouses today—that liability may not be imposed on parties who are not 
within the scope of § 10(b)’s plain language—is inconsistent with long-established SEC 
and judicial precedent . . . . judicial restraint does not always favor the narrowest 
possible interpretation of rights derived from federal statutes.”). 
 67. Scott M. Murray, Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver: 
The Supreme Court Chops a Bough from the Judicial Oak: There is No Implied Private 
Remedy to Sue for Aiding and Abetting Under Section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5, 30 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 475, 540 (1996). 
 68. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104–67, 109 Stat 
737 (1995). 
 69. SEC v. Fehn, 97 F.3d 1276, 1282–83 (9th Cir. 1996). 
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which mischaracterized the role of the director.70  Fehn challenged the 
SEC’s ability to bring the case, citing, as Justice Stevens warned, the 
decision in Central Bank for the proposition that there was no liability 
for aiding and abetting violations of the 1934 Act.71  The Ninth Circuit, 
however, quoted the clear language of the statute, and numerous parts of 
the legislative history, and held that the PSLRA had reversed the impact 
of Central Bank on SEC enforcement actions.72  The court also rejected 
Fehn’s argument that the statute did not apply to his action because it 
was not passed until after the litigation proceeded.73  The court pointed 
out that prior to Central Bank, which was not decided at the time of 
Fehn’s actions, the SEC had authority to pursue aiding and abetting 
violations. 74   Furthermore, the court found that the language of the 
PSLRA with respect to aiding and abetting mirrored that of existing case 
law, which indicated that it was the intent of Congress to keep in place 
the definition of aiding and abetting that existed prior to Central Bank.75 
4. Circuit Split on the Knowledge Requirement After PSLRA 
As this section will explain, although the PSLRA established that 
the SEC had the ability to bring aiding and abetting claims, it did not 
resolve all ambiguities as to the standard necessary for bringing such 
claims.  Despite the fact that the statute provides that the level of 
scienter necessary for knowledge of a primary violation is “knowingly,” 
the circuits were split over whether this standard was limited to 
situations where the defendants had actual knowledge of the primary 
violation, or whether they should have known of the primary violation. 
The court in Fehn, the first circuit court to discuss this matter, came 
to the conclusion that “knowingly” did, in fact, refer to actual 
knowledge.76  The Ninth Circuit based this decision, in part, on the fact 
                                                                                                                                         
 70. Id. at 1282. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 1283 (“Legislative history confirms that Section 104 was intended to 
override Central Bank ’s apparent elimination of the SEC’s power to enjoin the aiding 
and abetting of securities law violations.”). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 1284. 
 75. Id. 
 76. SEC v. Fehn, 97 F.3d 1276, 1295 (9th Cir. 1996). 
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that the level of scienter needed for establishing liability for aiding and 
abetting section 10(b) violations traditionally was “knowingly.”77 
The Second Circuit also acknowledged that the SEC had authority 
to assert aiding and abetting actions under section 10(b), but limited 
liability to situations regarding actual knowledge.78 Although the Second 
Circuit based its rationale on a simple textual reading of the statute,79 in 
SEC v. KPMG, the Southern District of New York went further into 
depth about the rationale for limiting liability to cases involving actual 
knowledge.80  The case concerned an accounting fraud perpetrated by 
the Xerox Corporation, in which Xerox misstated revenues by over $6 
billion.81  The SEC filed an enforcement action against KPMG, Xerox’s 
auditors, and four individuals who were KPMG partners at the time of 
the audit. 82   Although the SEC settled its case against KPMG, it 
continued its enforcement action against the individual partners for 
aiding and abetting Xerox’s violations of the 1934 Act.83  In doing so, 
the SEC argued that “recklessly” should be read into the PSLRA 
provisions.84    
In discussing the SEC’s claim against Thomas Yoho, a KPMG 
partner, for aiding and abetting, the court stated that the new provision 
provided for in the PSLRA should include cases where the person aiding 
and abetting should have known the primary violation was taking 
place.85  The court pointed out that “knowingly” had been defined as 
actual knowledge in the other places in the PSLRA, leading to the 
presumption that it should be applied in a similar way to the subsection 
regarding SEC actions as well.86 
The court also pointed to the PSLRA’s legislative history, which 
indicated that the Senate actually rejected an amendment that would 
                                                                                                                                         
 77. Id. 
 78. See SEC v. United States Envtl., Inc., 155 F.3d 107, 113 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(acknowledging that the SEC had the authority under the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act to pursue aiders and abettors but choosing not to address the issue of 
whether it address prior conduct because the SEC had not used argument in lower court 
decision). 
 79. Id. 
 80. See SEC v. KPMG, LLP, 412 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 81. Id. at 353. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 382–83. 
 85. Id. at 383. 
 86. Id. 
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have included a recklessness standard.87  In an attempt to expand the 
SEC’s authority further, Senator Robert Bryan attempted to amend the 
bill to explicitly add a recklessness standard.88  The Bryan Amendment 
was ultimately voted down. 89   The court in KPMG interpreted the 
rejection of the amendment to mean that Congress intended actual 
knowledge to be necessary for an aiding and abetting action, and 
therefore rejected the SEC’s argument. 90   Other courts employed a 
similar rationale to conclude that the standard was “knowingly.”91 
Despite the reasoning of the KPMG and Fehn courts, other circuits 
came to the conclusion that the language in the PSLRA did include a 
recklessness standard.92  In SEC v. Tambone, the First Circuit found that 
recklessness was indeed covered.93  In Tambone, the SEC alleged that 
executives of a mutual fund, Columbia Funds Distributor, aided and 
abetted in misrepresentations made in fund prospectuses.94  The court 
found that because the defendants had a duty to disclose the violations, 
recklessness was indeed sufficient to meet the “knowingly” prong of the 
PSLRA.95  The D.C. Circuit agreed with the First Circuit in Graham v. 
SEC, finding that recklessness was sufficient to meet the scienter 
requirement.96 
5. “Substantial Assistance” Element in Federal Courts 
Prior to 2012, the element of substantial assistance hinged on 
proximate cause.97  This was illustrated best in a Second Circuit case 
concerning a former Connecticut State Senator, Joe DiBella.98  DiBella 
had served on the Investment Advisor Council, which oversaw decisions 
made by the Connecticut State Treasurer.99  The SEC alleged that the 
                                                                                                                                         
 87. Id. at 357. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 383. 
 91. Bromberg & Lowenfels, Controlling Person Liability, supra note 18, at 10. 
 92. See, e.g., SEC v. Tambone, 550 F.3d 106 (1st Cir. 2008). 
 93. Id. at 144. 
 94. Id. at 110. 
 95. Id. at 144. 
 96. Graham v. SEC, 222 F.3d 994, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 97. See infra Part IV. 
 98. See SEC v. DiBella, 587 F.3d 553, 566 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 99. Id. at 558. 
 99. Id. 
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State Treasurer, Paul Silvester, had made an agreement to invest $75 
million of Connecticut’s pension fund with an asset management firm in 
exchange for fees for himself and DiBella.100  Silvester eventually pled 
guilty to Federal Racketeering charges; and DiBella was charged, 
among other things, with aiding and abetting Silvester in engaging in a 
fraudulent scheme contrary to Rule 10b-5 for his part in the fraud.101 
In evaluating DiBella’s actions, the court explained in order to 
satisfy the substantial assistance prong to show aiding and abetting 
liability, the SEC had to show that the aider and abettor proximately 
caused the violation.102  It was clear to the court that DiBella fit this 
role.103  DiBella had arranged the meeting, knew that the Silvester was 
required to present all investment opportunities to the Investment 
Advisor Council, and knew that he had in fact not done so.104  Moreover, 
when prodded by the asset management firm, Dibella convinced 
Silvester to raise Connecticut’s stake in the firm by $25 million.105  
Thus, the court held, there was substantial evidence that DiBella 
knowingly aided and abetted Silvestre in violating Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5.106   This analysis represented the typical analysis of the 
substantial assistance prong prior to 2012.107 
6. Elements of Aiding and Abetting in Administrative Proceedings 
The primary difference between SEC administrative proceedings 
and enforcement actions is that the former are adjudicated by 
administrative law judges rather than federal district court judges.108  
Under this arrangement, either the defendant or the agency can appeal 
                                                                                                                                         
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 559–60. 
 101. Id. at 560. 
 102. Id. at 566. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 567. 
 105. Id. at 566–67. 
 106. Id. at 567. 
 107. See also SEC v. Benger, 697 F.Supp.2d 932, 942–43 (N.D. Ill. 2010). 
 108. SEC administrative proceedings differ from enforcement actions in that they 
are heard initially by an administrative law judge rather than a federal district court 
judge.  For a brief discussion of the differences between two, see How Investigations 
Work, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/News/Article/Detail/Article/ 
1356125787012#.Us3kOJETFuY (last visited July 15, 2013). 
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the initial decision to the Commission itself.109  Depending on what end 
it seeks to achieve, the SEC can bring both enforcement and 
administrative actions.110  Historically, the SEC has taken a more lenient 
view as to the elements required to find liability for aiding and abetting 
in administrative proceedings.111 
Initially, the theory of liability argued by the SEC for aiders and 
abettors was as undefined as those in federal courts.112  In one of the 
earliest cases, the SEC found that a broker-dealer knowingly aided-
abetted his partner’s fraud on his investors.113  In finding liability, the 
administrative law judge determined that the defendant had reason to 
know that the actions he took would allow his co-defendant to effect 
fraud.114  Therefore, it is apparent that in early cases the knowledge 
requirement for aiding and abetting liability was merely constructive 
knowledge that some sort of impropriety was taking place.115  
In Investors Research Corp. v. SEC, however, the D.C. Circuit 
rejected the SEC’s imposing this lower threshold for knowledge.116  The 
SEC had sought disciplinary actions against brokers for aiding and 
abetting a violation of section 17(e)(1).117  After the defendant appealed 
the decision from the administrative law judge, the Commission tried to 
impose a mere negligence requirement.118  The D.C. Circuit rejected this 
formulation, finding that a mere negligence standard could impose 
liability on those who were innocently part of a fraudulent scheme.119  
The court then established a similar standard as that in Coffey, finding 
                                                                                                                                         
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Bromberg & Lowenfels, Aiding and Abetting Securities Fraud, supra note 9, at 
752–53. 
 112. Id at 753. 
 113. In re Burley & Co., Release No. 34-3838, 23 SEC 461 (Aug. 5, 1946), 
available at 1946 WL 24142. 
 114. Id. at *2. 
 115. Bromberg & Lowenfels, Aiding and Abetting Securities Fraud, supra note 9, at 
753. 
 116. Investors Research Corp. v. SEC, 628 F.2d, 168, 179 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
 117. Id. at 170. 
 118. Id. at 177–78. (The SEC argued that that aiders and abettors should be held 
liable “whenever [they] should have been able to conclude that [their] act was likely to 
be used in furtherance of illegal conduct”). 
 119. Id. 
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that this test balanced the need to protect the public interest of avoiding 
fraud, without overburdening the securities industry with regulation.120 
Not long after the decision in Investors Research, the Commission 
used this formulation in the course of an administrative proceeding.  In 
re William R. Carter concerned two lawyers who allegedly abetted the 
securities violations of a telephone equipment rental company.121  The 
SEC brought an administrative proceeding alleging that the defendants 
misrepresented the financial condition of the company to both the SEC 
and stockholders under the SEC’s Rule (2)(e); had they been found 
guilty, they would be barred from appearing before the Commission.122  
The Commission, following the decision in Investors Research, found 
that while actual knowledge was too high a standard, negligence would 
be too harsh and would actually impose liability on those who were 
innocently a party to fraudulent schemes.123  Thus, while the standard in 
administrative proceedings did not rise to the level of actual knowledge 
as in some circuits, recklessness was still required. 
7. Substantial Assistance in Administrative Proceedings 
SEC administrative proceedings require a lower standard for 
liability than federal courts.124  In an early case, In re Richard Bruce & 
Company, the SEC sought aiding and abetting liability against the vice-
president of Transition Systems, Stanley Gross.125  Transition Systems 
had sold thousands of shares on reports that it had a “correlator” ready 
for market. 126   The correlator allegedly could monitor the body 
conditions of astronauts while in orbit, and the American Medical 
Association was interested in it for its ability to detect cancer.127  While 
Gross had nothing to do with the representations, the tribunal barred him 
from association with broker-dealers anyway, finding that through his 
                                                                                                                                         
 120. Id. at 178. 
 121. In re William R. Carter, Release No. 34-17597, 22 SEC 292 (Feb. 28, 1981), 
available at 1981 WL 384414. 
 122. Id. at *4. 
 123. Id. at *24–25. 
 124. Bromberg & Lowenfels, Aiding and Abetting Securities Fraud, supra note 9, at 
753. 
 125. In re Richard Bruce & Co., Release No. 34-8303, 43 SEC 777, *3 (1968), 
available at 1968 WL 86058. 
 126. Id. at *1. 
 127. Id. 
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attendance at sales meeting, share of the profits, and general 
participation in the company’s operations, Gross knew, or at least should 
have known, of the illicit activities taking place.128  Thus, the SEC was 
applying a reckless standard of knowledge, and limited action in 
furtherance of the illegal activity.129    
 The case In re Glen Copeland also demonstrates the lower 
standard necessary in administrative proceedings.  In that case, the 
company defrauded its customers by misrepresenting its profits. 130  
Copeland had operated the company’s computer program.131  Each day, 
the company’s senior vice-president, Dennis Greenman, asked Copeland 
to multiply all account balances by an arbitrary number, in order to 
conceal the fact that all of the accounts were actually losing money.132  
Although Copeland argued he had no idea that Greenman was telling 
him to do this to conceal losses, the SEC found liability for aiding and 
abetting, stating that while he may not have been intimately involved in 
the planning of the scheme, sufficient red flags were present to alert 
Copeland that he was involved in illegal conduct.133  This standard is 
indicative of the one taken in administrative proceedings.  The court 
simply required significant involvement, not proximate cause.134 
B. ELEMENTS OF CONTROL PERSON LIABILITY PRIOR TO DODD-FRANK 
Congress intentionally left control undefined because it can take so 
many forms. 135   Given the lack of clear language or congressional 
directive, the SEC attempted to add clarity for the purposes of 
administrative proceedings by defining control explicitly as “the 
possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or cause the 
direction of the management and policies of a person, whether through 
                                                                                                                                         
 128. Id. at *3. 
 129. Id. 
 130. In re Glen Copeland, Release No. 34-22213, 48 SEC 193, 197–98 (1985), 
available at 1983 WL 108674. 
 131. Id. at 196. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 196–97. 
 134. See also In re Del Mar Fin. Servs., Release No. 188, 75 SEC 1473 (2001), 
available at 2001 WL 919968. 
 135. William H. Kuehnle, Secondary Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws-
Aiding and Abetting Conspiracy, Controlling Person, and Agency: Common-Law 
Principles and the Statutory Scheme, 14 J. CORP. L. 313, 356 (1989).  
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the ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise.”136  The 
SEC’s definition has been accepted by several courts.137  As this section 
will discuss, there is still substantial disagreement, however, over when 
control person liability is supposed to attach,138 and whether the SEC 
even has the authority to bring actions.139  The D.C. Circuit has made 
note of the fact that courts’ interpretation of section 20 has been 
inconsistent, particularly in the context of SEC enforcement actions.140 
1. SEC’s Ability to Bring an Action 
As this section will demonstrate, ambiguity under section 20(a) was 
not limited to the definition of control or when a control person was 
liable.  In SEC v. Coffey, the Sixth Circuit denied the SEC the right to 
bring enforcement actions under section 20(a). 141   It reasoned that 
because section 20(b) “set forth the standard of lawfulness to which a 
controlling person may conform, on penalty of liability in injunction to 
the SEC or criminal prosecution . . . . [§ 20(a)] was meant only to 
specify the liability of controlling persons to private persons suing to 
vindicate their interest.”142  Furthermore, the SEC was not a person as 
required by Section 20(a).143  Therefore, the SEC’s ability to bring an 
action was limited to Section 20(b) violations.144 
Most circuits, however, did not follow the decision in Coffey, 
particularly after the Securities Act of 1975, which amended the 
definition of person under the Exchange Act to include “a natural 
person, company, government, or political subdivision, agency, or 
instrumentality of a government.”145 
In SEC v. First Jersey, the SEC initiated an enforcement action 
against both a broker-dealer and its principal.146  First Jersey convinced 
                                                                                                                                         
 136. 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2014). 
 137. See, e.g., SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc, 101 F.3d 1450, 1472–73 (2d Cir. 1996); 
Maher v. Durango Metals, Inc., 144 F.3d 1302, 1305 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 138. See infra Part II.B.b. 
 139. See id. 
 140. SEC v. Savoy Indus., Inc., 587 F.2d 1149, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
 141. SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1318 (6th Cir. 1974). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. 15 U.S.C. § 78c (2012). 
 146. SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc. 101 F.3d 1450, 1456 (2d Cir. 1996). 
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customers to buy securities at excessively high prices, making more than 
$27 million in illegal profits.147  The action was against both First Jersey 
and Robert Brennan, the director and 100% owner. 148   The Second 
Circuit found that even if Brennan wasn’t found primarily liable for the 
fraudulent actions, the SEC could still prosecute him under § 20(a).149  
The court held that section 20(a) was available as an enforcement 
mechanism to “any person to whom such controlled person is liable” 
and stated that the new language in the 1934 Act could be interpreted to 
find that the SEC was included in the definition of person.150 
The Third Circuit agreed with this decision.151  While it did not 
disagree with the reasoning of Coffey at the time it was decided, the 
court pointed out that the Coffey decision was undermined by the 1975 
amendments to the Exchange Act, which modified the definition of 
person from “an individual, corporation, partnership, association, joint 
stock company, business trust, or unincorporated organization” to a 
“natural person, company, government, or political subdivision, agency 
or instrumentality of a government.”152  Therefore, the court found that 
section 20(a) explicitly applied to the SEC.153 
Prior to Dodd-Frank, however, not all courts followed the 
reasoning that the SEC had the ability to bring an action under section 
20(a).154  In SEC v. Stringer, an Oregon district court rejected the SEC’s 
argument that the agency had authority to pursue an enforcement action 
under section 20(a), choosing instead to follow the reasoning in 
Coffey.155  Unlike Coffey, however, Stringer took into account the 1975 
amendments, but chose to ignore them.156  In response to the SEC’s 
citation to the amendments to prove they were indeed a person who 
could bring an action, the court responded that even with the new 
language of the amendments, there still existed an “escape clause” 
allowing courts to ignore the definitions when context suggested 
                                                                                                                                         
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 1458. 
 149. Id. at 1472. 
 150. Id. 
 151. SEC v. J.W. Barclay & Co., 442 F.3d 834, 842–43 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 152. Id. at 842. 
 153. Id. 
 154. See, e.g., SEC v. Stringer, CIV. 02-1341-ST, 2003 WL 23538011, *4 (D. Ore. 
Sept. 3, 2003). 
 155. Id. at *4. 
 156. Id. at *5–6. 
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otherwise.157  The court went on to explain how the SEC should not be 
defined as a person in this context, pointing out that for a party to be a 
person under the statutory definition, secondary actors had to be jointly 
and severally liable to the party.158  In other words, the person needed to 
be an injured party.159  Since the SEC is a government agency rather 
than a party that can be injured by a secondary actor, the court found it 
would be stretching the statutory language too far to consider the SEC a 
person. 160   The court then pointed out that there was little in the 
legislative history of the 1975 amendments indicating any desire by 
Congress to allow the SEC to pursue enforcement actions under section 
20(a).161  The court concluded that although securities laws were meant 
to be interpreted in accordance with their broad remedial purposes, the 
text and legislative history simply did not indicate any authority for the 
SEC to pursue section 20(a) violations.162 
2. Elements Necessary to Prove Control Person Liability 
In addition to the authority granted to the SEC to bring an action 
under section 20(a), there is a split among the circuits over what would 
constitute liability.163  The SEC has codified an official definition in 
order to establish a uniform standard.164  The definition provides that 
control is “the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or 
cause the direction of the management and policies of a person, whether 
through the ownership or voting securities, by contract, or otherwise.”165  
Even circuits that have adopted the SEC’s definition have not done so 
word for word, and some have rejected it altogether.  The two primary 
                                                                                                                                         
 157. Id. at *6. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. (“The issue is not simply whether the SEC falls within the statutory 
definition of the word ‘person.’ Instead, the issue is whether the SEC constitutes a 
“person to whom such controlled person is liable,” not only generally but ‘jointly and 
severally.’ It strains the statute to characterize a secondary actor as ‘liable to’ the SEC. 
The SEC is the government agency tasked with enforcing the federal securities laws. It 
is not an injured party.”). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at *13. 
 163. See In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 294 F. Supp. 2d 392, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003) (explaining ambiguous state of law as to control person liability under § 20(a)). 
 164. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.405 (2014). 
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methods by which control is defined are the “potential control” test, and 
the “culpable participation test”. 
a. Culpable Participation Test 
The Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits apply the “culpable 
participation” test. 166   The Second Circuit applied this test in First 
Jersey, explaining that “a plaintiff must show a primary violation by the 
controlled person and control of the primary violator by the targeted 
defendant, and show that the controlling person was in some meaningful 
sense a culpable participant in the fraud perpetrated by the controlled 
person.”167  The court also proffered a defense that could be made to a 
section 20(a) charge, explaining that a control person could show good 
faith by proving he put in place and enforced a “reasonable, proper 
system of supervision and internal controls.”168  Thus, in order to escape 
liability for First Jersey’s fraudulent activity, Robert Brennan would 
have had to show that he had a system in place to detect and prevent the 
conduct that was committed and personnel had just evaded the system.  
In the matter at hand, the court found that First Jersey’s methods were 
not genuinely designed to prevent fraud.169 
b. Potential Control Test 
The majority standard for control person liability is the “potential 
control” test. 170  Although it exists in different iterations across the 
circuits, the most common standard is the one articulated by the Eighth 
Circuit.171  In order to show potential control, the plaintiff must prove 
that the defendant participated in the operations of the corporation in 
question.172  The plaintiff then must prove “that the defendant possessed 
                                                                                                                                         
 166. Massey, supra note 1, at 114–15. 
 167. SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1472 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 1461 (quoting SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 890 F. Supp. 1185, 1202 
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the power to control the specific transaction upon which the primary 
violation is predicated.”173 
C. JANUS CAPITAL GROUP V. FIRST DERIVATIVE TRADERS AND ITS 
APPLICATION TO SEC ENFORCEMENT FOR SECONDARY LIABILITY 
This section will discuss the impact of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Janus Capital Group. v. First Derivative Traders and its 
impact on the SEC’s strategy for bringing enforcement actions.  First, 
this section will explain the background of the case and the language of 
the majority decision as well as that of the Justice Breyer’s dissent.  It 
will then explain how the Janus decision has been interpreted by courts 
thus far.  Finally, it will discuss how the decision will affect the SEC’s 
enforcement strategy given the new remedies afforded them by Dodd-
Frank. 
1. Janus Capital Group v. First Derivative Traders 
Like Central Bank, the most recent Supreme Court case to have 
possible implications on SEC enforcement actually concerned a private 
right of action.  In Janus Capital Group. v. First Derivative Traders, a 
class of stockholders filed suit under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.174  
The suit alleged that Janus Capital Management (“JCG”) and its wholly 
owned subsidiary, Janus Capital Management (“JCM”), made false 
statements in mutual fund prospectuses filed by Janus Investment Funds 
(a separate legal entity owned entirely by its investors, for which Janus 
Capital Management was the investment adviser and administrator).175  
Specifically, the investors argued that prospectuses issued by Janus 
Investment Fund stated that JCM would implement policies to curb 
market timing, while in fact they entered into agreements encouraging 
it.176  When a New York Attorney General’s investigation revealed the 
secret agreements, investors withdrew significant amounts of money 
from Janus Investment Fund mutual funds, which in turn caused JCG’s 
                                                                                                                                         
 173. Id. at 10 (quoting Brown v. Enstar Grp., Inc., 84 F.3d 393, 396 (11th Cir. 
1996)). 
 174. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2300 
(2011). 
 175. Id. at 2299. 
 176. Market timing is a trading strategy that exploits time delay in mutual funds’ 
daily valuation system. See id. at 2296 n.1. 
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stock price to drop nearly 25%. 177   The plaintiffs in this action 
previously owned JCG stock and argued that by claiming they would 
take measures to curb market timing, JCG and JCM “materially misled” 
the public.178  The plaintiffs also alleged that JCG should be held liable 
as the control person for Janus Investment Funds.  The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari as to whether JCM made the material misstatements in 
the prospectuses.179 
The majority opinion, written by Justice Thomas, found that JCM 
did not make the misstatement.180   Justice Thomas cited the Oxford 
English Dictionary in explaining that to “make a statement” one must 
have “ultimate authority over the statement,”181 and compared the role of 
JCG to that of a speechwriter.182   Justice Thomas also stated that a 
broader reading of make would undermine Central Bank’s holding that 
there is no private right of action against aiders and abettors, while 
acknowledging that those actions could still be brought by the SEC.183 
The majority also denied First Derivative’s argument that the 
significant influence JCM wielded over Janus Investment Funds made it 
liable.184  The Court declined to extend liability in this way, explaining 
that it was “undisputed” that JCM and Janus investment fund were 
legally separate entities.185 
2. Justice Breyer’s Dissent and Warning About Implications 
Justice Breyer, writing for the dissent, took issue with the 
majority’s definition of “make,” pointing out that “every day, hosts of 
corporate officials make statements with content that more senior 
officials or the board of directors have ‘authority to control.’”186  Justice 
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 184. Id. at 2304. (“First Derivative’s theory of liability based on a relationship of 
influence resembles the liability imposed by Congress for control.”). 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 2307 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
664 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XIX 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
Breyer argued that a contextual, case-by-case determination, was a 
better test for whether someone “made” a statement.187 
Justice Breyer also pointed out that Central Bank was 
distinguishable because it dealt with issues of secondary liability, 
whereas the case before the court concerned primary liability.188  Breyer 
cited portions of Central Bank that discussed how secondary actors may 
be liable, and pointed out that by ruling in favor of JCM, the majority’s 
decision essentially extends Central Bank’s holding to those who are not 
liable, given that Janus Management easily fell into the category of 
those who were meant to be held liable.189 
Much like the dissent in Central Bank, the dissent in Janus shows 
concern that the majority opinion might reach further than the private 
rights of action to which the opinion is ostensibly limited.  As Justice 
Breyer points out, given the majority’s holding made it exceedingly 
difficult to find a single party who “made” a statement in cases similar 
to Janus.”190  The SEC’s ability to pursue actions for aiding and abetting 
would thereby be reduced as well, given need for a primary violation 
when bringing an aiding and abetting charge.191  Justice Breyer also 
argued that while the majority’s decision was based on their professed 
desire to avoid undermining Central Bank,192 by removing liability from 
entities such as JCM, the majority was doing just that—it ignored 
explicit restrictions the Central Bank decision gave on the interpretation 
of its holding.193 
3. Post-Janus Jurisprudence 
At first glance, it is difficult to tell the impact of Janus.  While 
there is no doubt the decision limits the ability of private entities to seek 
                                                                                                                                         
 187. Id. at 2306 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 188. Id. at 2308 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Justice Thomas responded to this argument 
in a footnote to the majority opinion, acknowledging that Central Bank was indeed 
about secondary liability.  Justice Thomas explains that “[f]or Central Bank to have any 
meaning, there must be some distinction between those who are primarily liable (and 
thus may be pursued in private suits) and those who are secondarily liable (and thus 
may not be pursued in private suits).” Id. at 2302 n.6. 
 189. Id. at 2307–08. (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 190. Id. at 2311 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 191. Id. at 2310 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 192. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 193. Id. at 2308 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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damages under Section 10b-5, as this section will discuss, there is also 
some indication that it will have an impact on SEC enforcement cases, 
particularly in their pursuit of liability against secondary actors.  
Therefore, the SEC’s strategy in pursing secondary actors to a large 
degree depends on how expansively courts view the Janus holding.  
While there have been few post-Janus cases, the ones that have been 
decided indicate the diverging views that courts are taking towards the 
holding. 194 
a. Broad Interpretation of Janus 
The Southern District of New York was the first court to analyze 
the Janus decision in the context of an SEC enforcement action.195  SEC 
v. Kelly concerned an enforcement action against former senior 
executives at AOL Time Warner.196  The SEC charged that AOL had 
paid inflated prices for goods and services, which were offset by large 
“purchases” of online advertising, thereby artificially inflating AOL 
Time Warner’s bottom line.197  The Commission asserted that each of 
the defendants were aware of, and in some way contributed to, the 
fraudulent activity, and brought charges under section 10(b), Rule 10b-
5, section 17(a)(1), 198  as well as for aiding and abetting those 
violations.199 
After Janus was decided, however, defendants Wovsaniker and 
Rinder moved for judgment on the pleadings given that the new 
                                                                                                                                         
 194. See, e.g. SEC v. Kelly, 765 F. Supp. 2d 301 (S.D.N.Y. 201); SEC v. Daifotis 
874 F. Supp. 2d 870 (N.D. Cal. 2012); SEC v. Pentagon Capital Mgmt., PLC, 844 F. 
Supp. 2d 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 195. SEC v. Kelly, 765 F. Supp. 2d 301 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 307. 
 198. Section 17(a) of the Securities Act makes it unlawful in the offer or sale of any 
security, using the mails or an instrumentality of interstate commerce, directly or 
indirectly 
(1) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud, or 
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or 
any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in 
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser. 
15 U.S.C. §77q(a) (2012). 
 199. Kelly, 765 F. Supp. 2d at 321–22. 
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standard for make foreclosed the SEC’s claims against them with 
regards to section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 violations.200  In an indication of 
the impact of Janus on enforcement actions, the SEC acknowledged that 
it could not proceed under Rule 10 b-5(b).201  However, the SEC argued 
that it could still proceed under “scheme liability” under subsections 
10b-5(a) and 10b-5(c).202 
The court rejected this argument.203  While it acknowledged that the 
Janus decision did not discuss scheme liability, it found that recasting 
Rule 10b-5(b) claims as Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) claims was simply a 
“back door into liability” meant to avoid limitations on Rule 10b-5(b) 
actions.204  The court relied heavily on Justice Thomas’s footnote in 
response to Justice Breyer205 to argue that the decision in Janus was 
made in order to preserve the distinction between primary liability and 
secondary liability.206  While the SEC had offered a mechanism to assert 
its claim, the fact remained that none of the defendants had made a 
misstatement as required by Janus, and therefore, the court argued, they 
should not be held liable.207  The SEC’s approach would allow plaintiffs 
to bring actions based on conduct the Janus court had found as 
insufficient to establish primary liability.208 
The court in Kelly also found that the Janus analysis was not 
restricted to actions taken under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.209  The 
                                                                                                                                         
 200. Kelly, 765 F. Supp. 2d at 342. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id.  Whereas Rule 10b-5(b), which was the provision of Rule 10b-5 discussed 
in the Janus decision, makes it illegal to “make any untrue statement of a material fact 
or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the 
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, Rule 10b-5(a) 
bars the use of “any device, scheme or artifice to defraud” while Rule10b-5(c) prohibits 
engaging in “any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as 
a fraud or deceit upon any person.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 (2014). 
 203. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d at 343. 
 204. Id. 
 205. See supra note 188. 
 206. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d at 343. 
 207. “The court explained that the alleged round trip transactions by AOL between 
2000 and 2003 are deceptive only because of AOL’s subsequent public 
misrepresentations. . . .  It is the manner in which those transactions were accounted for 
by AOL and reported to the public- AOL’s alleged improper recognition of advertising 
revenue from such transactions - that is deceptive, and not the act of engaging in such 
transactions itself.” Id. at 344. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. at 345. 
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court rejected the SEC’s argument that actions were restricted to those 
claims, finding that given the similar purposes with regards to primary 
liability, application of Janus as to section 17(a) should be consistent 
with application to Rule 10b-5(b).210  Thus, the SEC was still required to 
show that the defendants “made” the misleading statements.211  Since the 
SEC did not plead as such, the court found it could not impose liability 
and dismissed all claims.212 
This decision was likely troubling to the SEC and to those who 
feared that Janus could be interpreted too broadly.  By extending its 
application to both scheme liability and section 17(a), the decision in 
Kelly indicated that the window through which not only private parties, 
but also the SEC could bring charges against secondary actors, was far 
narrower than it had been before.  The Central District of California has 
followed this reasoning to extend Janus beyond Rule 10b-5(b) as 
well.213  
b. Broad Interpretation of Janus in Administrative Proceedings 
In another troubling sign, in one of the few administrative 
proceedings to consider the impact that Janus had on SEC enforcement 
actions, an administrative law judge chose to apply the Janus standard to 
scheme liability and section 17(a) charges.214  The SEC had brought an 
administrative proceeding accusing the defendants, executives at State 
Street, of misleading or making insufficient disclosures to investors as to 
the extent of mortgage back securities held in their accounts.215  The 
administrative law judge cited the decision in Kelly to find that Janus 
did in fact apply, meaning that the SEC had to show that the defendants 
had ultimate authority over the fraudulent statements. 216   Thus, the 
                                                                                                                                         
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. at 346. 
 213. SEC v. Perry, CV-11-1309 R, 2012 WL 1959566 1, at *8 (C.D. Cal. May 31, 
2012) (applying Janus to section 17(a) actions). 
 214. In re Flannery, Release No. 677, 101 SEC 1973 (Oct. 28, 2011), available at 
2011 WL 10564337 (holding that under the Janus standard, defendants did not meet the 
test of “ultimate authority or responsibility” for documents in which misstatements 
were made). 
 215. Perry, 2012 WL 1959566, at *2. 
 216. Id. 
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SEC’s ability to bring action was not simply limited to enforcement 
actions in federal courts. 
c. Narrow Interpretation of Janus 
However, just months after the decision in SEC v. Kelly, a district 
court in the Northern District of California interpreted Janus 
differently.217   In SEC v. Daifotis, the SEC brought an enforcement 
action against two former Schwab YieldPlus Fund (a subsidiary of 
Charles Schwab) executive officers, Randall Merk and Kimon P. 
Daifotis.218  Daifotis was the lead portfolio manager of the YieldPlus 
Fund, and he reported to Charles Schwab Investment Management, 
where Merk was President.219  The SEC alleged that Daifotis and Merk 
each made misleading statements about the safety of YieldPlus as an 
investment vehicle, and made misleading statements to investors to 
dissuade them from redeeming their investment when the Fund began to 
decline in value.220 
While the case was pending, Janus was decided.  The defendants 
therefore moved for reconsideration, hoping to have certain alleged 
misstatements dismissed. 221   While the SEC maintained that the 
defendants were still liable for the misstatements defendants sought to 
dismiss, it did not contest the dismissal of the bulk of the allegations.222  
Thus, as in SEC v. Kelly, the Commission essentially conceded its 
reduced ability to pursue actions under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
after Janus.223 
The court, however, rejected Daifotis’s argument that Janus applied 
to section 17(a).224  In doing so, the court pointed out how precisely the 
                                                                                                                                         
 217. SEC v. Daifotis, 874 F. Supp. 2d 870 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
 218. Id. at 873–74. 
 219. SEC v. Daifotis, No. C 11-00137 WHA, 2011 WL 4714250, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 
Oct. 7, 2011). 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id.  The defendants conceded that under Janus, they had “made” certain 
statements, such as a set of questions and answers listing Merk as the author on 
Schwab’s website, or statements made by Daifotis in a series of conference calls. Id. at 
*2–3. 
 222. Id. at *4 (“[T]he Commission does not oppose that Janus renders all other 
alleged misstatements in the complaint ineligible to serve as a base for claim one 
liability against either defendant.”). 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at *5. 
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Janus majority parsed the language of § 10(b) and distinguished it from 
section 17(a), pointing out that the word “make,” which was the primary 
statutory language discussed in Janus, did not exist in the language of 
section 17(a).225 
The court also rejected Daifotis’s defense that Janus should apply 
to section 34(b) of the Investment Companies Act,226 despite the fact 
that that provision actually includes the word “make.”227   The court 
points out that Janus was limited to consideration of section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5.228  It held that applying Janus to all statutes would, in effect, 
give the decision far too much weight and ignore the purpose of the 
decision.229  Thus, the court did not extend Janus’s holding beyond Rule 
10b-5.230 
Cases after Daifotis and Kelly have shown a trend towards adopting 
the rationale of the former.  For example, in the Southern District of 
New York, in SEC v. Pentagon Capital Management PLC,231 the court 
did not even acknowledge Kelly, and instead relied on Daifotis to find 
the lack of the word “make” in section 17(a) to mean that Janus should 
not apply to enforcement actions under section 17(a), or scheme liability 
pursuant to Rule 10b-5(a) or (c). 232   In doing so, the court also 
emphasized the fact that Janus was a private suit as opposed to an 
enforcement action, stating that it saw no indication from the Supreme 
Court, or from Congress, that the Janus decision should extend beyond 
Rule 10b-5.233   Moreover, the Second Circuit on appeal declined to 
conclusively discuss the extent to which Janus should apply, although it 
acknowledged that Rule 10b-5(b) was the sole provision the Supreme 
Court gave guidance on. 234   Other cases have followed the same 
                                                                                                                                         
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-33 (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for any person to make any 
untrue statement of a material fact in any registration statement, application, report, 
account, record, or other document filed or transmitted pursuant to this subchapter or 
the keeping of which is required pursuant to section 80a-30(a) . . . .”). 
 228. Daifotis, 2011 WL 3295139, at *6. 
 229. Id. (“Janus was not a touch stone to change myriad laws that happen to use the 
word ‘make’; it was decision interpreting primary liability under Rule 10b-5.”). 
 230. Id. 
 231. SEC v. Pentagon Capital Mgmt., PLC, 844 F. Supp. 2d 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 232. Id. at 422. 
 233. Id. 
 234. SEC v. Pentagon Capital Mgmt., PLC, 725 F.3d 279, 287 (2d Cir. 2013). 
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rationale to find that Janus does not extend to other provisions of the 
Securities Acts.235 
The Southern District of New York has also explicitly rejected the 
idea posited in Kelly that asserting scheme liability is simply a “back-
door” method of evading the Janus holding.236 In SEC v. Landberg, the 
court considered an enforcement action against the management of an 
unregistered investment advisory for misleading investors as to the 
security of their funds.237  The court rejected the defendant’s argument 
that Janus prohibited the SEC from bringing a Rule 10b-5 action, 
pointing out that subsection (b) was not the only provision of section 
10(b).238  Thus, given the decisions in Kelly, Landberg, and Pentagon 
Capital Management, there is a split in the Second Circuit as to whether 
Janus applies to SEC enforcement actions pursuant to Rule 10b-5(a) and 
(c), and whether it applies beyond Rule 10b-5. 
Some courts have questioned whether Janus should apply to SEC 
enforcement actions at all.239  In SEC v. Brown, the Commission brought 
an enforcement action against two former employees of Integral, a 
publicly traded company that manufactures satellite systems and 
software.240  It alleged that defendant Elaine Brown, in her capacity as 
Chief Financial Officer and Principal Accounting Officer, had violated 
section 13(a) of the 1934 Act241 by failing to state in documents with the 
SEC that Integral had re-hired a former executive who had been found 
guilty of earlier securities violations.242  Brown argued that by narrowing 
the private right of action under Rule 10b-5, the court in Janus was 
implicitly suggesting that courts should not go beyond the plain 
language of a statute to create individual liability where it does not 
                                                                                                                                         
 235. See, e.g., SEC v. Stoker, 865 F. Supp. 2d 457, 465(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Janus 
implicitly suggests that Section 17(a)(2) should be read differently from, and more 
broadly than, Section 10(b).”); SEC v. Mercury Interactive, LLC, No. 5:07-cv-02822-
WHA, 2011 WL 5871020, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2011) (“The operative language of 
§§ 14(a) and 17(a) does not require that the defendant “make” a statement in order to be 
liable.”). 
 236. SEC v. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d 340, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 237. SEC v. Landberg, 836 F. Supp. 2d. 148, 151 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 238. Id. at 154. 
 239. See, e.g., SEC v. Brown, 878 F. Supp. 2d 109, 118 (D.D.C. 2012); SEC v. 
Sentinel Mgmt. Grp., No. 07 C 4684, 2012 WL 1079961, at *14–15 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 
2012). 
 240. Id. at 112. 
 241. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (2012). 
 242. Brown, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 112–13. 
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exist.243  The court in Brown outright rejected this argument, and pointed 
out that pursuant to section 21(d)(1) of the 1934 Act the SEC was 
authorized to bring actions in district courts to enjoin violations of any 
provision of its title.244  Thus, the court considered whether the SEC’s 
ability to bring enforcement actions should be affected by Janus at all.245 
The Northern District of Illinois expanded on this concept in SEC v. 
Sentinel Management Group.246  In discussing whether Janus should 
apply to actions taken pursuant to section 17(a), the court noted that the 
rationale behind the Court’s decision in Janus was a concern that an 
overly expansive definition of “make” would expand the scope of 
private suits.247  However, because section 17(a) did not create a private 
right of action, the Supreme Court’s concerns were not implicated.248  
Therefore, the court found Janus did not apply to section 17(a) actions, 
while also strengthening the case for why it should not apply to SEC 
enforcement actions at all.249 
Thus, the state of law as to whether Janus applies beyond a Rule 
10b-5 action is unclear.  Even within the Second Circuit, there is a split 
as to the extent in which it should apply.250  Furthermore, there is a 
strong case to be made that the decision should never apply to SEC 
enforcement actions. 251 
III. IMPACT OF DODD-FRANK ON STATUTORY REMEDIES FOR SEC TO 
BRING ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 
Like the original securities laws, Dodd-Frank was enacted in 
response to public sentiment about inappropriate behavior on the part of 
the financial community—this time, the events leading up the financial 
                                                                                                                                         
 243. Id. at 117–18. 
 244. Id. at 118 (“Brown has put forth no persuasive reason why this passage from 
Janus, specifically limiting the scope of private rights of action under Rule 10b-5, 
should be read to reach enforcement actions brought by the SEC pursuant to Rule 13a-
14”). 
 245. Id. 
 246. No. 07 C 4684, 2012 WL 1079961 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2012). 
 247. Id. at *15. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Compare SEC v. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d 340, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), with SEC 
v. Landberg, 836 F. Supp. 2d. 148, 151 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 251. SEC v. Brown, 878 F. Supp. 2d 109, 118 (D.D.C. 2012). 
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crisis of 2008.252  The legislative history indicates that Congress actually 
considered extending civil liability not only in SEC actions, but as a 
private cause of action as well.253  While the drafters of Dodd-Frank 
ultimately declined to go that far, the statutory language does clarify 
those remedies available to the SEC.254  This Part will discuss how the 
statutory language clarifies the remedies available to those seeking 
liability for violators of the Securities Acts.  It will then discuss how 
these new remedies have affected the SEC’s enforcement strategy 
giving the treatment of Janus by federal courts. 
A. IMPACT ON AIDERS AND ABETTORS 
Dodd-Frank greatly expanded the SEC’s ability to pursue aiding 
and abetting violations.255  The statutory language explicitly gave the 
SEC authority to pursue violations under section 15(b) of the Securities 
Act of 1933, as well as the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.256  It also 
clarifies the ambiguity left by the PSLRA by explicitly stating that the 
SEC may prosecute anyone who “knowingly or recklessly” provides 
substantial assistance to another person who violates any provision of 
the 1934 Act.257  This is, of course, a substantially lower bar for bringing 
claims than actual knowledge.  While it remains to be seen the impact 
that Dodd-Frank will have on aiding and abetting actions, because they 
cannot be applied retroactively, it is clear that they will greatly increase 
the SEC’s chances of success in those cases.258  
                                                                                                                                         
 252. Helene Cooper, Obama Signs Overhaul of Financial System, N.Y. TIMES, July 
22, 2010, at B3. 
 253. While it ultimately did not decide to extend a private right of action, Congress 
did commission a study by the Government Accountability Office to study whether or 
not one would be appropriate. 
 254. See infra Part III.A–B. 
 255. COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE, DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND 
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: LAW, EXPLANATION AND ANALYSIS (2010). 
 256. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No 11-203 §929O, 123 Stat. 1376, 1862 (2010) 
(amending Exchange Act § 20(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e)). 
 257. Id. 
 258. See discussion infra Part IV. 
2014] DODD-FRANK'S IMPACT ON  673 
SEC ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 
B. IMPACT ON CONTROL PERSON LIABILITY 
 Dodd-Frank clarifies the SEC’s ability to prosecute for control 
person liability under the Exchange Act.259  The Act makes clear that the 
SEC may bring actions under control person liability in federal court by 
inserting language explicitly referencing SEC enforcement actions.260  
The control persons bear the burden of showing that they acted in good 
faith, and that “they did not directly or indirectly induce” the primary 
violation.261  Thus, while a seemingly minor change, the SEC now has 
no doubt about its ability to bring control person actions.262  The impact 
this could have on its enforcement strategy will be discussed in Section 
F. 
C. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN SECONDARY LIABILITY POST DODD-FRANK 
AND JANUS 
A recent decision in the Second Circuit clarifying the substantial 
assistance prong of aiding and abetting could affect the SEC’s strategy 
post-Janus and Dodd-Frank.  SEC v. Apuzzo concerned an action against 
Joseph Apuzzo, the Chief Financial Officer of a construction and mining 
equipment manufacturer, Terex.263  In accordance with an arrangement 
with a second company, General Electric Credit Corporation, Apuzzo 
helped disguise a third company, United Rental Inc.’s (“URI”) risks and 
financial obligations, and approved invoices he knew to be inflated.264  
                                                                                                                                         
 259. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No 11-203 §929P, 123 Stat. 1376, 1865 (2010) 
(amending Exchange Act § 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a)). 
 260. The new language states: 
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any provision 
of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be liable jointly and 
severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any person to whom 
such controlled person is liable (including to the Commission in any action brought 
under paragraph (1) or (3) of section 78u(d) of this title), unless the controlling person 
acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting 
the violation or cause of action. 
15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2012). 
 261. Bruce Hiler & Sharon Rose, Analysis of Changes to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission’s Enforcement Powers in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act, 42 BNA INSIGHTS 48 (2010). 
 262. See generally CCH, supra note 253. 
 263. SEC v. Apuzzo, 689 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 264. Id. at 207–08. 
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In addition, despite his knowledge that some of URI’s equipment was 
overvalued, Apuzzo offered auditors a note indicating that “nothing 
ha[d] come to his attention” to make him question the valuation of 
URI’s equipment. 265   In exchange, URI agreed to make substantial 
purchases of equipment from Terex.266  The district court agreed with 
Apuzzo’s argument that there was nothing to show that his conduct 
caused the primary violation.267 
The Second Circuit reversed, however, using a classic definition of 
aiding and abetting drawn from criminal law to find that the “test for 
substantial assistance is that the aider and abettor “in some sort 
associated himself with the venture, that he participated in it as in 
something that he wished to bring about, and that he sought by his 
action to make succeed.”268  The court emphasized that due to Central 
Bank and the PSLRA, enforcement actions differed from private 
litigation, and clarified that the SEC did not have to show that an aider 
or abettor was the proximate cause of a primary securities law 
violation.269 
In Apuzzo, Judge Rakoff also acknowledged the consequences of a 
standard for substantial assistance that was too high for the SEC to 
prove, arguing that given the lack of a private of a right of action for 
aiding and abetting violations,270 imposing too high of a proximate cause 
requirement would essentially allow all aiders and abettors to avoid 
                                                                                                                                         
 265. Id. at 209. 
 266. Id. at 207. 
 267. Id. at 211. 
 268. Id. at 213. 
 269. Id. (“We now clarify that . . . the SEC is not required to plead or prove that an 
aider an abettor proximately caused the primary securities law violation. . . 15 U.S.C. § 
78t(e), was passed in the wake of Central Bank precisely to allow the SEC to pursue 
aiders and abettors . . . . This statutory mandate would be undercut if proximate 
causation were required for aider and abettor liability in SEC enforcement actions.”). 
 270. Due to the decision in Central Bank and Stoneridge v. Scientific-Atlanta, 
private parties cannot bring actions for aiding and abetting.  The Court in Stonebridge 
rejected the idea that secondary actors would escape liability if the private right of 
action was further diminished: “Since September 30, 2002, SEC enforcement actions 
have collected over 10 billion in disgorgement and penalties, much of it for distribution 
to injured investors.  The inability to bring aiding and abetting actions and reduced 
ability to bring primary actions under 10(b) means investors may have to rely even 
more on SEC enforcement actions.” Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-
Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 166 (2008). 
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liability.271  In doing so, Judge Rakoff was likely acknowledging the 
lack of remedies for pursuing aiders and abettors. With the SEC being 
the sole entity that could bring action against them, a burden that was 
too high would let those who aided and abetted escape without 
consequences far too often.272   
D. SEC ENFORCEMENT IN AIDING AND ABETTING ACTIONS AFTER JANUS 
AND DODD-FRANK 
While even the SEC seems to have conceded the point that the 
narrow take on the definition of “make” has removed its ability to bring 
enforcement actions under Rule 10b-5(b), its series of victories after 
Kelly indicates that Janus’s effect on its ability to pursue securities law 
violators under primary liability may be quite narrow.  The post-Janus 
case law indicates that courts are somewhat reluctant to extend the 
definition of “make” beyond Rule 10b-5(b) actions.  Rather than 
asserting liability under Rule 10b-5, the SEC will attempt to use other 
provisions in the federal securities laws, such as section 17(a) or 
“scheme liability” under Rule 10b-5(a) or (c). 
However, given the changes to Dodd-Frank, it behooves the SEC to 
add section 20(e) aiding and abetting charges in addition to charges of 
primary liability, particularly if other circuits follow the standard set by 
Apuzzo. 273 With the lowered standard of knowledge written into section 
20(e) under Dodd-Frank, as well as the decision in Apuzzo, the SEC has 
a much clearer path to victory to aiding and abetting violations than they 
did prior to the Act.  A recent case, SEC v. Big Apple Consulting USA, 
could signal the trend the SEC will take given the implications of the 
Janus ruling.274 
In that case, the SEC sought an enforcement action against Big 
Apple, its wholly owned subsidiary, MJMM, and three executives for 
their connection to Cyberkey, a party who was not involved in the 
litigation, but who had had fraudulently reported a contract with the 
Department of Homeland Security.275  The SEC initially alleged, among 
other violations, section 10(b), Rule 10b-5 and section 17(a) 
                                                                                                                                         
 271. Id. 
 272. Apuzzo, 689 F.3d at 213. 
 273. See id. at 213. 
 274. SEC v. Big Apple Consulting USA, Inc., 6:09-CV-1963-ORL-28, 2012 WL 
3264512 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 9, 2012) 
 275. Id. at *2. 
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violations.276  However, after Janus was decided, the SEC withdrew 
their section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 charges, and added section 20(e) 
charges for aiding and abetting. 277   The court allowed the SEC to 
proceed on the section 17(a) claims, as well as the aiding and abetting 
claim.278  This case is indicative of what the SEC’s strategy maybe with 
its ability to use Rule 10b-5 diminished but new powers gained under 
Dodd-Frank.279  With the Commission’s ability to find primary liability 
diminished, it likely will assert secondary liability as an alternative 
option.280 
The provisions relating to aiding and abetting cannot be applied 
retroactively.281  The D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Graham v. SEC,282 while 
pre-Dodd Frank, could offer a perspective as to how courts could treat 
aiding and abetting defendants under the recklessness standard.  In that 
case, the court found a broker liable for failing to notice that a customer 
was fraudulently trading in stocks.283  The court noted, however, that it 
was not holding Graham liable for executing the fraudulent trades, but 
for failure to notice “numerous suspicious circumstances.”284   These 
trades included “economically irrational trading,” the fact that she knew 
her client was experiencing financial difficulties, and the client’s 
insistence on specifying the contra-broker with whom he wanted 
Graham to execute the trade.285 
More recent cases demonstrate that a recklessness standard will 
make aiding and abetting violations a great deal easier than before.  The 
Southern District of New York has found allegations of recklessness are 
met where the SEC showed that the defendant didn’t fulfill its duty to 
monitor, or did not notice obvious signs of fraud.286  In another case, the 
court found the defendant liable where the SEC was able to show that 
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the defendant had access to information that demonstrated she knew or 
should have known that fraud was taking place.287 
With regards to substantial assistance, the Southern District of New 
York has already used the Apuzzo standard successfully to find 
executive officers of the Federal National Mortgage Association liable 
under section 20(e) for aiding and abetting misrepresentations of their 
company’s subprime mortgage exposure.288  The court found that the 
officers fit the new standard because they reviewed periodic filings, 
commented on, discussed, and signed SEC filings in which fraudulent 
misrepresentations were made.289 
Thus, not only does the SEC have a significantly lower burden for 
bringing aiding and abetting actions, but it also potentially has a wider 
net from which to seek liability for improper corporate activity. 290 The 
SEC should continue to use section 20(e) against both primary violators 
for whom it thinks the Janus standard might make it too difficult to 
succeed on a primary violation claim, and secondary violators such as 
accountants, lawyers, investment banks, and other entities who clearly 
could have put a stop to fraudulent activity. 
E. LIMITATIONS 
Of course, the increased ability to pursue aiders and abettors is not 
a cure-all for issues the SEC may have with enforcement after Janus.  
Although Daifotis was a victory for the SEC in its refusal to apply Janus 
beyond Rule 10b-5, the court also indicated that Justice Breyer’s dissent 
might have been prophetic in its warning about the ability of the SEC to 
pursue secondary actors. 291   In charging Daifotis with aiding and 
abetting, the Commission alleged that the primary violator was Charles 
Schwab. 292   The court granted summary judgment as to aiding and 
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abetting under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 pointing out that in order to 
show that Daifotis aided and abetted a primary violation, the SEC had to 
show scienter on the part of Charles Schwab, which it had not yet 
done.293  The court also granted summary judgment as to violations of 
the Investment Advisers Act.294 
Furthermore, as Judge Rakoff acknowledged in lowering the 
standard for substantial assistance in Apuzzo,295 the SEC is the only one 
who can pursue aiding and abetting liability.  It would be logistically 
impossible to pursue every person or company who can be found to 
have aided and abetted a securities law violation.296  While the Dodd-
Frank Act also demanded a study about the merit of a private right of 
action against aiders and abettors,297 it is unlikely that any action will be 
taken on that soon. 298   Therefore, the SEC must carefully pick and 
choose who asserts aiding and abetting liability against. 
F. CONTROL PERSON LIABILITY AFTER DODD-FRANK 
It is difficult to assess the impact of control person liability after 
Dodd-Frank given the paucity of cases.  However, despite the circuit 
split, shortly before Dodd-Frank was enacted, the SEC had brought 
control person liability suits in two high-profile cases.299  Roughly a year 
before Dodd-Frank was enacted, the SEC brought charges against 
former AIG CEO Hank Greenberg for securities fraud violations made 
by the insurance company.300   The case was eventually settled by a 
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consent agreement, in which Greenberg agreed to pay $15 million 
dollars.301  The same month, the SEC brought control person charges 
against Nature’s Sunshine Products, its CEO, Douglas Faggioli, and its 
former CFO, Craig D. Huff.302  The defendants also all agreed to consent 
agreements, which enjoined them from future violations, and paid civil 
penalties as well.303 
These cases demonstrate that the SEC was not afraid to use control 
person liability where it saw fit, even with its ability to bring actions 
ambiguous.  With its ability to pursue control person actions clarified, 
the SEC is likely to assert control liability as an enforcement mechanism 
more often.304  As one commentator has pointed out, given the typical 
enforcement action brought by the SEC, it is not difficult for the 
Commission to find one or more executives who should have been on 
notice for fraudulent activity going on.305   However, because Dodd-
Frank did not resolve the circuit split about the degree that a control 
person needed to be involved in order to be liable, it is still unclear how 
successful a control person action will be. 
It is worth noting that since the settlement agreements reached in 
Greenberg and National Securities Products, there has been intense 
judicial scrutiny over SEC use of consent agreements whereby the 
Commission secures a fine from the defendant without demanding the 
defendant admits wrongdoing.306  Judge Rakoff of the Southern District 
of New York, the most high-profile of these critics, set a new precedent 
by refusing to enforce a settlement agreement between the SEC and 
Citigroup over Citigroup’s fraudulent activities in the period leading up 
to the final crisis.307  The SEC, Judge Rakoff explained, was not acting 
in the public interest by simply allowing Citigroup to settle the action 
without demanding serious consequences or an admission of guilt.308  
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This decision is currently pending before the Second Circuit 309  and 
could have a significant impact on the way in which control person 
liability is pursued.  If the Second Circuit finds that the no-admit 
settlements were against the public interest, as Judge Rakoff indicated, 
then the SEC may be less willing to bring actions.  The cost of litigation 
for each and every control person enforcement action to its finality 
could prove prohibitive.  However, these scenarios could also mean the 
SEC will seek severe consequences in the cases where they do assert 
control person liability. 
CONCLUSION 
The trend in courts indicates that courts are reluctant to extend 
Janus beyond Rule 10b-5 actions.  However, with the new weapons to 
assert aiding and abetting liability against secondary actors, the SEC 
should nonetheless continue to add section 20(e) and section 20(a) 
violations to primary ones.  While the diminished ability to bring section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 actions will hurt chances of establishing a primary 
violation, the lower burdens of proof for secondary liability will give the 
Commission a greater chance of success in pursing secondary actors.  
Furthermore, given that private parties have even less recourse to assert 
any kind of liability against secondary actors, it is necessary for the SEC 
to fill in the gap. 
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